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COMMENTS
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY
I. Introduction
In Parker v. Brown,1 the Supreme Court held that anticompetitive
activities authorized and implemented by states are beyond the in-
tended reach of the Sherman Act. 2 Under the aegis of the Parker
doctrine, 3 municipalities were widely believed to be protected from
the strictures of the antitrust laws. 4 Recently in Community Cor-
1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See notes 26-33 infra and accompanying text.
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)). The
Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive conduct. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST 20-21 (1977). The Act "rests on the premise that the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress
while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). The legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates that
it was directed at abuses of private business and capital. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC.
2457, 2459, 2460 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman); id. at 2469 (remarks of Sen.
Reagan); id. at 2562 (remarks of Sen. Teller) (antitrust law seeks to curb "these great
trusts, these great corporations, these large moneyed institutions"); id. at 2647 (re-
marks of Sen. Vance); id. at 2726 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id. at 3147 (remarks of
Sen. George). The remaining federal antitrust laws, see 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976)
(defines "antitrust laws"), are (1) the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976) (pro-
scribes exclusive dealing, anticompetitive mergers, and interlocking directories), (2)
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976)
(proscribes anticompetitive price discrimination not justified by cost differentials)
and (3) the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976) (proscribes
unfair methods of competition).
3. Through custom and usage, the terms "Parker doctrine" and "state action
doctrine" refer to the protection from antitrust liability which the Court in Parker v.
Brown afforded to states and their instrumentalities. See, e.g., Community Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 838 (1982) (refers to "Parker
doctrine"); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 392
(1978) (refers to "state action doctrine"). These terms are used interchangeably in this
Comment.
4. See, e.g., Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs. Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543,
551 (M.D.N.C. 1979) (protection applied when municipalities acted purely in gov-
ernmental capacity or pursuant to state direction), citing E.W. Wiggins Airways,
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir.) (antitrust laws are aimed
at private, not government, action), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); see Note, The
Antitrust Liability of Municipalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REV. 368,
379-81 & n.68 (1977) (limited precedent involving municipal defendants in 30 years
following Parker due to assumption of municipal exemption under this decision);
Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
518, 524 n.54 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Municipal Activities].
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munications Co. v. City of Boulder,5 the Supreme Court treated
municipalities as private parties for purposes of the Parker doctrine.6
This decision exerts a significant impact upon municipal governmen-
tal operations. Potential municipal antitrust liability increases bond
interest 7 and insurance costs. 8 Municipal treasuries will be strained by
costs incurred in defending antitrust suits.9 Treble damage liability'l
imposes the spectre of municipal bankruptcy." Moreover, uncertainty
surrounding the Boulder decision' 2 exerts a chilling effect upon mu-
5. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
6. For the Parker doctrine to apply, the anticompetitive activities of private
parties must (1) further clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policies
and (2) be actively supervised by the state. See notes 48-49 infra and accompanying
text. In Boulder, the Court applied the "clear articulation" requirement to munici-
palities and indicated strongly that the "active state supervision" requirement would
also apply. 102 S. Ct. at 841 & n.14; see notes 81-87 infra and accompanying text.
7. Bond Buyer, July 1, 1982, at 4 (remarks of Mayor Hayes testifying before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on behalf of the United States Conference of Mayors);
id. (remarks of Mayor Moody testifying on behalf of the National League of Cities).
Higher interest rates result from increased investor risk associated with municipal
activities now subject to the antitrust laws. Mayor Moody argues that potential
antitrust challenges to municipal regulation will discourage the underwriting of
municipal revenue bonds. Id.
8. See Liability Lawsuits: Cities Large and Small Suffer, A.P. Report, May 16,
1982 [City Liability] (remarks of Dennis Connolly, senior counsel for the American
Insurance Association).
9. Federal Antitrust Laws and Local Government Activities: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) (testimony of William
F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division) (Department of Justice
transcript) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Washington Post, March 19, 1982, at B3
(remarks of Sally Lackey of Maryland Municipal League); id., Jan. 14, 1982, at A2.
In Boulder, the respondent argued that denial of a Parker exemption to municipali-
ties would unduly burden the federal courts. 102 S. Ct. at 843. The Court dismissed
this argument as "simply an attack" upon the wisdom of the congressional commit-
ment to competition embodied in the antitrust laws. Id.
10. The Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ...shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). On
ripeness grounds, the Court has left open the question whether remedies applicable
against private corporate violators are appropriate when applied against municipali-
ties. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 843 n.20 (case's preliminary posture prevents confronta-
tion of the remedies issue); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 402 n.22 (same). Clear
statutory language and strong policy arguments indicate that municipalities would
be liable for treble damages. See note 209 infra.
11. The four Justices dissenting in City of Lafayette recognized the certainty of
municipal bankruptcy resulting from a typical treble damage award. 435 U.S. at 440
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun observed that the treble damages sought
equals $28,000 for each family of four residing within these municipalities. Id. at 442
n.I (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
.12. This uncertainty is due largely to the Court's refusal to indicate whether
remedies and substantive antitrust principles applicable to private defendants are
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nicipalities seeking to provide innovative services.1 3 These concerns
have generated substantial support for an amendment to the antitrust
laws protecting municipal activities.14
The Burger Court characterizes its interpretation of the Parker
doctrine in terms of exemption analysis.15 This analysis is typically
applied to conflicting federal statutes."' This Comment, however,
argues that preemption analysis, applied when federal statutes con-
flict with state or municipal enactments,' 7 should be used by the
appropriate for municipal defendants. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 843 n.20; see note 10
supra. The following experts have commented adversely on the uncertainty gener-
ated by the Boulder decision: (1) Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter,
Hearings, supra note 9, at 2; (2) Representative of the National League of Cities Tom
Moody, Bond Buyer, July 1, 1982, at 4; (3) Representative of the United States
Conference of Mayors Janet Gray Hayes, id. ("it is largely the uncertainty that the
Boulder decision has created that is the evil that needs correction").
13. Hill, Former Attorney General Warns of Effects of Antitrust Ruling, A.P.
Report, April 30, 1982 [Cities-Antitrust] (comments of Mr. Civiletti). Similar con-
cerns were generated by the City of Lafayette decision. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S.
at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Comment, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Apply-
ing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 563, 567
(1979).
14. The National League of Cities recently proposed a three-part "municipal
action exemption" from the antitrust laws to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Bond
Buyer, July 1, 1982, at 4. This test first requires cities to "establish a policy to
substitute regulation or monopoly public service for competition. Second, the city
would have to supervise the activities or functions that it regulates. Third, the city
would have to be acting within its authority under state law." Id. A federal legisla-
tive solution to the Boulder decision has been advocated by Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Chairman Strom Thurmond, id.; Benjamin Civiletti, Hill, Former Attorney
General Warns of Effects of Antitrust Ruling, A.P. Report, April 30, 1982 [Cities-
Antitrust]; and former president of the National League of Cities William Hudnut,
U.P.I. Report, May 19, 1982 [Homerule]. The present Administration is undecided
as to whether a federal legislative response to Boulder is appropriate. See Hearings,
supra note 9, at 9.
15. See note 53 infra.
16. Exemption analysis is applied when the federal antitrust laws conflict with a
federal regulatory scheme. See, e.g., National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States,
436 U.S. 816 (1978) (Sherman Act and Capper-Volstead Act); Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (Sherman Act and Federal Power Act); Hughes
Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (Federal Aviation Act
and Sherman Act); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)
(Clayton Act and Bank Merger Act of 1960); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341 (1963) (Sherman Act and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). In Silver,
the Court stated that exemption analysis "reconciles the operation of both statutory
schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted." Id. at 357.
17. Preemption analysis is applied when the federal antitrust laws conflict with a
state or municipal regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 102 S.
Ct. 3294 (1982) (California liquor importer designation statute and Sherman Act);
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109-11 (1978) (California
franchising regulation and the Sherman Act); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117 (1978) (Maryland retail gasoline regulation and federal antitrust laws);
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courts in applying the Parker doctrine to municipalities." Alterna-
tively, this Comment will advocate a qualified municipal exemption
from the antitrust laws.' 9 Since municipalities receive less federal
deference 20 than states, 2 ' this exemption should not be coextensive
with that enjoyed by states under the Parker doctrine. However, the
preferential treatment 22 that municipalities receive in our federalist
system as compared to private parties mandates formulation of a
municipal exemption. Constitutional and practical difficulties en-
countered under substantive antitrust law 23 and at the remedies
stage 24 in accounting for the noncompetitive public benefits 25 con-
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (California raisin prorate program and Sher-
man Act); Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904) (Galveston, Texas pilotage regulation
and the Sherman Act).
18. Specifically, this Comment advocates preemption analysis because (1) a ma-
jority of the Court has expressly adopted preemption analysis in applying the Parker
doctrine to nonmunicipal defendants, see note 129 infra and accompanying text, (2)
the Court in Parker engaged in preemption analysis, see notes 125-28 infra and
accompanying text and (3) preemption analysis is analytically sound as applied to
conflicting federal and state or municipal enactments, see notes 88-90 infra and
accompanying text.
19. This qualified exemption reflects the constitutional protection accorded mu-
nicipalities by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976)
(integral municipal operations in areas of traditional government functions are con-
stitutionally protected from federal interference); see notes 138-47 infra and accom-
panying text. The qualified exemption is narrower than the exemption recently
proposed by the National League of Cities to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See
note 14 supra (municipalities' statutory exemption coextensive with that afforded
states under the Parker doctrine).
20. See note 59 infra for a definition of "federal deference."
21. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412 (plurality opinion) (municipalities exempt
from antitrust laws when state legislature "contemplates" their anticompetitive ac-
tivities) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (unlike states, municipalities not immune from suit in
federal court under eleventh amendment)).
22. This preferential treatment stems from constitutional limitations on federal
legislative power, see text accompanying notes 138-68 infra, in addition to federal
legislation reflecting these limitations. See text accompanying notes 169-206 infra.
23. Compliance with the Boulder standard may unconstitutionally interfere with
state delegation of power to municipalities. See note 147 infra. Imposition of treble
damages may unconstitutionally interfere with municipal fiscal integrity. See note
147 infra. Substantive antitrust laws do not measure noncompetitive benefits and
harms. See notes 207-11 infra and accompanying text. Allowing municipalities to
defend anticompetitive activities in terms of traditional public health, safety and
welfare benefits facilitates unrestrained judicial review. See notes 212-22 infra and
accompanying text.
24. Remedies applicable against antitrust violations are delineated in clear statu-
tory language and encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws. See note 209
infra.
25. See note 210 infra (municipal public purposes).
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ferred by municipalities support these departures from the Boulder
decision.
II. The Parker Doctrine: Application of Antitrust
Law to Government Entities
A. Parker v. Brown: the Seminal Decision
The Supreme Court first explicitly recognized state sovereignty as a
limitation on the reach of the Sherman Act in Parker v. Brown.26
Parker involved an elaborate program regulating the production and
distribution of raisins which was authorized by the California legisla-
ture and enforced by state agents. Finding "nothing in the language of
the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was
to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature, ' 27 the Court upheld the program. This interpretation of
legislative intent was influenced profoundly by principles of federal-
ism. 2s However, the Parker Court did not view federalism as an
affirmative limitation upon the Sherman Act's application to states
because it assumed that Congress, through its commerce power,2 9
could prohibit the state program. 30
26. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, a producer and packer of raisins sought
injunctive relief. Id. at 344. He named as defendants officials charged by state statute
to administer the prorate act. Id. Prior to Parker, the Court addressed state sanc-
tioned anticompetitive activity on two occasions. See Teply, Antitrust Immunity of
State and Local Government Action, 48 TUL. L. REv. 272, 274-75 (1974). In Olsen
v. Smith, the Court held that municipal licensing of harbor pilots was not preempted
by the Sherman Act. 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904). Earlier that term, the Court
rejected the defense that a challenged merger was not preempted by the Sherman Act
because it was made pursuant to state corporation law. Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
27. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
28. The Court stated that "[i]n [our] dual system of government in which, under
the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over
its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." Id. at 351. The
Court has frequently reiterated the federalist underpinnings of its Parker decision.
See, e.g., Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 842 (municipality restricts cable television expan-
sion); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
103 (1980) (state authorized wine resale price maintenance); City of Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 415-16 (municipality provided electricity); id. at 421 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring); see generally Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a Federalist System,
1980 ARiz. ST. L.J. 305, 320-21.
29. The commerce clause empowers Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This constitutional provision grants Congress plenary authority,
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 46 (1974); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941), to free the national economy from unjustifiable local
entanglements. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753,
760 (1967); cf. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977)
1982]
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A unanimous Court assumed that the program would violate the
Sherman Act if it were conducted by private parties. 3' The Court also
noted that a state may not protect private anticompetitive conduct
through mere authorization or declaration of legality. 32 In addition,
the Court emphasized that the state was not involved in a private
anticompetitive agreement. 33 Hence, the Court required that a gov-
ernmental entity, rather than a private party, retain the decision
making power for the exemption to apply.
B. Supreme Court's Application of Parker to Private Parties
In a line of decisions following Parker,34 the Court has reiterated its
refusal to shield private anticompetitive decisions made under the
pretense of state authorization from antitrust scrutiny. The Court
denied a private party an exemption in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar 35 and determined that before private parties will be granted a
state action exemption, their anticompetitive activities must be com-
(the commerce clause seeks to create an area of free trade among the several states);
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (direct federal regulation pursuant to the commerce clause and indirect federal
regulation under the antitrust laws have the same basic goal-to maximize alloca-
tional efficiency). The tenth amendment requires that congressional exercise of its
commerce power must avoid impairing the states' ability to function effectively as
separate and independent entities in our federal system. Fry v. United States, 421
U.S. 542, 547-48 & n.7 (1975); see B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126-29 (2d
ed. 1979).
30. 317 U.S. at 350.
31. Id. Professors Davidson and Butters take issue with this assumption. Davidson
and Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on the Federal
Interdiction of Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REv. 575, 597 (1978).
They pose the question whether Congress could amend the Sherman Act to proscribe
anticompetitive state action, id., and reach a negative conclusion. Id. at 604 (relying
on National League of Cities); see note 147 infra (discusses constitutional infirmities
in treble damage liability and municipal compliance with the Boulder standard).
32. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351, citing Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 332, 344-47 (1904); cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384, 389 (1951) (while invalidating state enforcement of resale price maintenance,
the Court noted "when a state compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it
demands private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids").
33. Parker, 317 U.S. at 352. It has been argued that the Court in Parker implicitly
equated states with municipalities. Case Comment, Antitrust State Action Defense
Expanded to Include Home Rule Municipalities: Community Communications Com-
pany v. City of Boulder, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 1026, 1029 (1980) (analyzing circuit court
opinion in Boulder).
34. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
35. 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (unanimous decision). Goldfarb involved a potential
client's claim of unlawful price fixing through a minimum fee schedule for lawyers.
Id. at 778. This schedule was published by the county bar, a private association, and
enforced by the state bar, a state agent for limited purposes. Id. at 776-78. Only the
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pelled by the state acting as sovereign. 36 In Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co. ,3 a state regulated private utility that engaged in an illegal tying
arrangement 38 was denied an exemption. Findings of neutral state
policy towards the anticompetitive activity 39 and insufficient public
participation in the decision making process were central to the
Court's holding. 40 These findings evidenced the Court's concern that
the federal policy of competition was being unnecessarily and inap-
propriately subordinated to private interests.41 Such concern is as-
suaged where the state policy is affirmatively implemented by the
appropriate state agency. Thus, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,42 the
Court granted an exemption where the state policy proscribing attor-
ney advertising was implemented by the affirmative command 43 of
Virginia Supreme Court was authorized by state law to regulate the legal profession.
Id. at 789 & n.18.
36. Id. at 791; cf. id. at 790 (Parker protects anticompetitive activity required by
the state acting as sovereign). In denying an exemption, the Goldfarb Court noted
that the fee schedules were not required by any state statute or by the appropriate
state agency-the Virginia Supreme Court. Id. at 790-91. This strict "compulsion"
standard is better understood in view of the Court's recognition that the state bar
joined in an essentially private anticompetitive activity by enforcing the county bar's
fee schedule. See id. at 792.
37. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). In Cantor, a state regulated private utility furnished light
bulbs to its customers without separate charge. A rate structure approved by the
Michigan Public Service Commission reflected bulb cost. These rates could not be
changed unless the utility filed for, and the commission approved, a new tariff. Id. at
582-83. A light bulb retailer claimed that the utility tied light bulb distribution to its
monopoly power in furnishing electricity. Id. at 581 & n.3.
38. A tying arrangement "exists when a seller, having a product which buyers
want (the 'tying product'), refuses to sell it alone and insists that any buyer who
wants it must also purchase another product ('the tied product')." L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 431 (1977).
39. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 585. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that (1)
light bulb distribution in the state was unregulated, (2) the desirability of the
challenged program was not investigated by the state legislature or regulatory agency
and (3) other state regulated utilities did not operate similar programs. Id. at 584-85.
40. Id. at 594-95. Parker was distinguished on the grounds that no public agencies
or agents were parties in Cantor. Id. at 591. This distinction was crucial as the Court
later intimated that Cantor would have been a completely different case had the
defendant been a public agency or agent rather than a private party. Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361 & n.13 (1977).
41. 433 U.S. at 362 (clear articulation of state policy) (distinguishing Cantor, 428
U.S. at 594 (state regulatory commission acquiesces in anticompetitive activity insti-
gated by private utility)).
42. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates, two lawyers challenged the proscription of
attorney advertising by the Arizona Supreme Court. The court is authorized by the
state constitution to oversee the state's legal profession. Id. at 360.
43. This affirmative command was expressed in disciplinary rules adopted by the
Arizona Supreme Court. Id. The Court distinguished Goldfarb on the grounds that
the private anticompetitive activity in that case was not required by the appropriate
1982]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
the Arizona Supreme Court. 44 Similarly, a state statutory scheme
regulating automobile dealership franchising was accorded Parker
doctrine protection in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox
Co. 45 Rather than a privately initiated restraint of trade 46 this case
was found to involve a "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed" state policy reflected in a state regulatory system. 47 In Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. ,48
the Supreme Court required private parties seeking a state action
exemption to establish both (1) a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy to replace competition and (2) active state su-
pervision of the regulatory scheme. 49
C. Supreme Court Application of Parker to Municipalities
The Court first considered application of the Parker doctrine to
municipalities in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 50
state agency. Id. at 359-60. In distinguishing Cantor, the Court noted that in that
case the state (1) was not a real party in interest and (2) merely acquiesced in private
anticompetitive conduct. Id. at 361-62.
44. Under the state constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court oversees the state
legal profession. This state agency subjected the advertising ban to "pointed re-
examination" in enforcement proceedings. Id. at 362. In concluding that the dangers
which caused concern in Cantor, see text accompanying notes 39-40 supra, were
reduced in Bates, the Court "deem[ed] it significant that the state policy [was] so
clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervision [was] so active."
Bates, 433 U.S. at 362.
45. 439 U.S. 96 (1978). A California statutory scheme required an automobile
manufacturer, intending to establish or relocate a franchise in an area occupied by an
objecting franchisee, to secure approval from a state administrative agency. Id. at
103.
46. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389
(1951) (state enforced private resale price maintenance).
47. 439 U.S. at 109. The Court distinguished Schwegmann on the grounds that
the state administrative agency, rather than private franchisees, retained the power
to decide whether there was good cause to prohibit the proposed franchise. Id. at
110.
48. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Midcal involved a California statute requiring wine
producers and wholesalers to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the
state. Id. at 99. The state authorized and enforced the prices agreed upon by the
private parties without evaluating their reasonableness. Id. at 105; cf. Bates'
"pointed reexamination," note 44 supra.
49. The Court emphasized that both prongs of this test must be satisfied. Midcal,
445 U.S. at 105-06. Although the state policy was clearly expressed, an exemption
was denied for lack of active supervision. Id.
50. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). It has been suggested that the limited precedent prior to
this decision stemmed from an assumption that municipalities were not subject to the
antitrust laws. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. Prior to City of Lafayette,
the lower courts generally granted state subdivisions either an ipso facto exemption,
see, e.g., Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.
[Vol. XI
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Pursuant to state statutory authority," petitioner cities owned and
operated electrical utilities both within and beyond their respective
city limits. Responding to an antitrust counterclaim,5 2 petitioner ar-
gued that as state subdivisions they shared state exemption"3 from the
antitrust laws under the Parker doctrine.54
A sharply divided Court denied a state action exemption. 5 Em-
ploying the presumption against implied exclusions from the antitrust
1973) (antitrust laws not intended to restrain government action); E.W. Wiggins
Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 947 (1966) (antitrust laws are aimed at private, not government, action);
Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359, 363 (N.D. Tex. 1974)
(municipal grant of exclusive franchise exempt from antitrust laws), or required an
express or implied state legislative mandate for the anticompetitive activity. Kurek v.
Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 590 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated on remand, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979) (denies exemption as inadequate state mandate) (quot-
ing Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1975) (state intent to
restrain competition in a given area "may be demonstrated by explicit language in
state statutes, or may be inferred from the nature of the powers and duties given to a
particular government entity")).
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4162 (West 1966) (municipality may own and
operate revenue producing electric utility); id. § 33:4163 (West 1966) (municipality
may establish rates and regulations pertaining to utility services); id. § 33:1326 (West
1951) (municipality may extend utility service beyond its territorial bounds).
52. Initially, petitioner cities alleged that respondent, a privately owned electrical
utility service which competed with them beyond their city limits, engaged in anti-
competitive conduct. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 392 n.5. The counterclaim
alleged the petitioner conspired to engage in sham litigation and to exclude competi-
tion through use of debenture covenants, long term supply contracts and tying
arrangements. Id. at 392 n.6.
53. The Court stated that "[t]he word 'exemption' is commonly used by the courts
as a shorthand expression for Parker's holding that the Sherman Act was not intended
by Congress to prohibit the anticompetitive restraints imposed by California in that
case." Id. at 393 n.8. But see note 16 supra and accompanying text ("exemption"
refers to judicial analysis of conflicting enactments of a single sovereign state). This
imprecise language may have confused the Court's analyis in City of Lafayette. See
note 88 infra (inappropriate use of exemption presumption).
54. The petitioners framed their argument as follows: "since a city is merely a
subdivision of a state and only exercises power delegated to it by the state, Parker's
findings regarding the congressionally intended scope of the Sherman Act apply with
equal force to such political subdivisions." Brief for Petitioner at 5, City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The Court reasoned that
implicit in petitioner's argument was the contention that Congress never intended to
subject local governments, apart from their status as state agents under the Parker
doctrine, to the antitrust laws. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 394.
55. Id. at 390. Justice Brennan authored a plurality opinion joined by Justices
Marshall, Powell and Stevens. The Chief Justice concurred in the judgment and Part
I of the plurality opinion. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion joined by
Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun joined all but Part II-B of this
opinion and filed his own dissenting opinion.
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laws,56 the majority rejected the petitioners' implicit 57 contention that
Congress never intended to subject municipalities to the antitrust
laws. 58 Noting that municipalities receive less federal deference 59 than
states,' 0 the plurality concluded that municipalities, as state subdivi-
sions exercising delegated power, do not benefit equally from the
Parker Court's finding that states are beyond the intended reach of the
Sherman Act."' The plurality recognized the municipal role in imple-
menting state policy 62 and departed from the "clear articulation"
standard applied to private parties in New Motor Vehicle Board.6 3
Adopting a standard formulated by the lower court,6 4 the plurality
56. Id. at 399; see notes 96-97 infra and accompanying text (origin of presump-
tion). Since this presumption properly applies to statutes enacted by a single sover-
eign state, the Court's analysis and conclusion are accordingly tainted. City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 427 n.1. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. See note 54 supra.
58. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408. The cities supported this contention by
indicating that the antitrust laws seek to prevent abuses of private power. Id. at 403.
In response, the majority reasoned that municipalities which promote the public
benefit of their local constituencies are not more likely to comport with the federal
procompetitive policy than private corporations, which further shareholder interests.
Id. Moreover, the Court noted that economic dislocation would result from munici-
palities making economic decisions counseled only by their own parochial interests.
Id. at 408. In addition, the Court rejected the argument that municipalities are
restrained from competitive abuses by the political process. Id. at 406-07 & n.33; cf.
note 157 infra and accompanying text (Court considered absence of effective political
restraints on states relevant in limiting state immunity from federal taxation).
59. The term "federal deference" refers to federal noninterference with state or
municipal affairs that either is constitutionally compelled, see notes 138-68 infra and
accompanying text, or a result of "legislative grace" (influenced by constitutional
concerns). See notes 175-206 infra and accompanying text.
60. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412. The plurality supported this conclusion
exclusively with cases construing the eleventh amendment and opined that the tenth
amendment is not even "tangentially implicated." Id. at 412 n.42. However, the
Court did not address whether remedies appropriate against private corporate de-
fendants also apply against municipal defendants. Id. at 402 n.22; cf. Boulder, 102 S.
Ct. at 843 n.20 (preliminary status of case renders remedies issue unripe). Since
cogent arguments have been raised that municipal treble damage liability violates
the tenth amendment, see note 147 infra, the Court's summarial dismissal of tenth
amendment arguments in City of Lafayette was premature.
61. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413.
62. Justice Brennan noted that municipalities are state instrumentalities for the
convenient administration of government within their limits and may thereby reflect
state policy. Id. at 413 (citing Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287
(1833)).
63. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text; see also United States v. South-
ern Motor Carriers Rate Confer. Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471, 484 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd,
672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982) (explicitly recognizing that municipalities, as "limited
sovereigns," face a less stringent standard than private parties after City of Lafay-
ette).
64. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th
Cir. 1976) (holding that the actions of a city are not automatically outside the scope
of the federal antitrust laws), aff'd, 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
[Vol. XI
1982] MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY 61
exempted municipal activities "contemplated" by the state legisla-
ture.6 5 In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger limited the plurality's
state "contemplation" standard to municipal proprietary activities. 6
The four dissenting justices maintained that the Sherman Act pro-
hibits private, rather than governmental anticompetitive conduct.6 7
Thus, every member of the City of Lafayette Court distinguished,
either expressly 8 or impliedly,6 9 municipalities from private parties.
Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,70
the Supreme Court equated municipalities with private parties for
Parker doctrine purposes. 71 Respondent City of Boulder is a home rule
municipality 72 which granted petitioner's assignor a non-exclusive
65. For an exemption to exist, the plurality required that "from the authority
given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature
contemplated the kind of action complained of." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
This standard received widely divergent application in the lower courts. Compare
Guthrie v. Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950, 956 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (required
express state authorization of municipal anticompetitive regulation) with Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 550 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979) (state contemplation "may be inferred from the nature of
the powers and duties given to a particular government entity") (citing Duke & Co.
v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1975)).
66. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 422 n.3, 424-25 (defining municipal proprietary
activities in terms of competitive relationship with private businesses) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Several commentators have recognized this limitation on the plurality
opinion. See, e.g., Taurman, Reflections on City of Lafayette: Applying the Anti-
trust "State Action" Exemption to Local Governments, 13 URB. LAW. 159, 166
(1981); Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5, 279-80 (1979).
67. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 428 & n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart reached this conclusion by interpreting the Sherman Act's legislative history
without the exemption presumptions utilized by the majority. Id. at 427 n. 1 (exemp-
tion presumptions have "no relevance to the Parker doctrine"); cf. United States v.
Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533, 560 (1939) (Sherman Act restrains private rather
than governmental action); Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc., 394
F.2d 672, 675-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968) (same).
68. The dissenters maintained that, unlike private parties, municipalities are be-
yond the intended reach of the Sherman Act. See note 67 supra and accompanying
text.
69. Rather than the "compulsion" standard then applicable to private parties, see
text accompanying note 36 supra, the plurality imposed the more lenient "contem-
plation" standard. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. The Chief Justice
implicitly equated states with municipalities acting in their governmental capacity.
See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
70. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
71. Compare id. at 841 (municipality must act pursuant to a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy) with New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W.
Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) (private parties must act pursuant to a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy). See notes 80-87 infra and ac-
companying text (municipalities must satisfy both articulation and supervision re-
quirements applicable to private parties).
72. Under the Colorado constitution, the City of Boulder has "the full right of self
government in both local and municipal matters." COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (4). In
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permit to provide cable television services within the city limits. 73
Petitioner alleged that a city ordinance temporarily prohibiting its
expansion violated the Sherman Act. 74 Relying on City of Lafayette,
the District Court denied a state action exemption and granted peti-
tioner a preliminary injunction. 75 Finding no municipal proprietary
activity at issue, the Tenth Circuit reversed. 7 The court distinguished
City of Lafayette, which involved revenue producing municipal util-
ity companies. 77
Relegating the circuit court's reliance on the nonproprietary nature
of the city's activities to a footnote,' a sharply divided Supreme Court
reversed and remanded. 79 The Court abandoned the "contemplation"
standard set forth in City of Lafayette80 and held that municipalities
are exempt from the antitrust laws only if they act to further clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policies. 81 The city did
not satisfy this requirement as the Court characterized the state pol-
icy 82 towards the challenged municipal conduct as "precise neutral-
ity."8 3 Since the "clear articulation" requirement was not satisfied, the
Court did not decide whether municipalities must also satisfy the
"active state supervision" requirement8 4 set forth in Midcal.85 In Mid-
cal, the Court required private parties to satisfy both the articulation
and supervision requirements before a state action exemption would
such matters, city charters and ordinances supersede state law. Id.; see generally
Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NLC) Model,
17 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1975); Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the
United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1968).
73. The permit was issued in the form of a revocable nonexclusive 20 year fran-
chise to use the city's public ways to string cable. Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1036 (D. Col.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
74. 485 F. Supp. at 1038. Since cable systems tend to become natural monopolies,
the city prohibited petitioner's expansion to give other cable companies an opportu-
nity to offer cable services. Id. at 1037.
75. Id. at 1041.
76. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
77. 630 F.2d at 708. The court observed that "[t]he City is not in the television
business in any way, and whether by contract or police power the action is an
exercise of governmental authority. There is no element of proprietary interest of the
City." Id. at 707.
78. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 842 n.18.
79. Id. at 844 (5-3 decision).
80. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
81. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 841.
82. The state policy was expressed in the home rule amendment to the state
constitution. Id. at 843; see note 72 supra.
83. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 843.
84. Id. at 841 n.14.
85. See text accompanying note 49 supra for the Midcal Rule.
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be granted.86 The Boulder majority did not suggest that the factual
distinctions between Boulder and Midcal were significant. 87 Thus, the
Court in Boulder implicitly equated municipalities and private parties
by indicating strongly that these distinct entities must satisfy identical
requirements for protection under the Parker doctrine.
III. Municipal Antitrust Liability: A Preemption Approach
Much of the confusion surrounding the Parker doctrine results from
the erroneous application of exemption,88 rather that preemption,
principles. 89 Preemption principles should be applied in determining
whether municipal laws and ordinances are void as inconsistent with
the federal antitrust laws.90 The use of preemption analysis will enable
the courts to accord municipalities appropriate federal deference.9
86. See note 49 supra.
87. By contrast, the majority noted that the antitrust laws and other federal laws
imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon"'persons" apply to both municipalities and
private corporations. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 843. Although the Court indicated in
dictum that municipalities may receive preferential treatment under substantive
antitrust law, id. at 843 n.20, such treatment may facilitate unrestrained judicial
review. See notes 212-22 infra and accompanying text; see also note 10 supra (Court
hedges on remedies issue).
88. In Cantor, the Court relied on exemption precedents, 428 U.S. at 596 n.36, in
opining that "Congress could hardly have intended state regulatory agencies to have
broader power than federal agencies to exempt private conduct from the antitrust
laws." Id. at 596. The City of Lafayette plurality compounded this doctrinal confu-
sion by inappropriately applying exemption presumptions, 435 U.S. at 398 (presump-
tion against implied exclusions), in inferring congressional intent to subject munici-
palities to the antitrust laws. Id. at 408.
89. See Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 846 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 618 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Handler, Antitrust-
1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (1978); cf. Davidson & Butters, supra note 31,
at 583 (Parker preempts private anticompetitive acts).
90. See notes 125-31 infra and accompanying text (preemption analysis); see also
note 2 supra (compiles federal antitrust laws). In determining whether the Sherman
Act preempts a state statute, the Supreme Court applies "principles similar to those
' . employ[ed] in considering whether any state statute is preempted by a federal
statute pursuant to the Supremacy Clause." Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 102 S. Ct.
3294, 3299 (1982) (state statute permitting delivery of distilled spirits only to licensed
importers designated by manufacturer not preempted). Principles of federal preemp-
tion apply similarly to state and municipal enactments. Compare Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (state exercise of historic police powers are
not preempted absent clear and manifest congressional purpose) with City of Bur-
bank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (municipal ordinance
enacted pursuant to historic police power not preempted absent clear and manifest
congressional purpose). Hence, no distinction will be made between states and
municipalities in articulating the principles determining the preemptive effect of the
federal antitrust laws on these government units.
91. See notes 104 & 111 infra and accompanying text.
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Exemption analysis entails reconciling conflicting enactments of a
single sovereign.9 2 The courts are required to determine the express or
implied legislative intent concerning the statutes at issue.9 3 Since the
enactments of only one sovereign are involved, the federalism con-
cerns underlying the Parker doctrine do not arise.9 4 The absence of
these tenth amendment concerns is most significant in the context of
implied exemptions, where the courts must reconstruct an unex-
pressed legislative intent and reconcile the divergent objectives of
ostensibly conflicting enactments.9 5 Since antitrust law furthers a
dominant national policy of competition, 6 implied exemptions from
antitrust law are strongly disfavored. 7 The Supreme Court requires a
demonstration of plain repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the
conflicting (federal) regulatory scheme for an exemption to exist.9 8
Even when this rigorous showing is made, an implied exemption is
granted only to the minimum extent necessary to allow operation of
the regulatory scheme.99
Preemption differs from exemption as it requires analysis of con-
flicting statutes enacted by separate sovereigns. 00 Since preemption
involves the interplay between federal and state or municipal govern-
ments, fundamental principles of federalism are operative.' 0' Hence,
presumptions operating in favor of the federal antitrust laws in ex-
92. See note 16 supra for examples of exemption decisions.
93. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 846 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Handler, supra note 89, at 1379.
96. See United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (Sherman
Act is the "Magna Carta" of free enterprise); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1948); Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-95 (1940).
97. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 217, modified, 383
U.S. 932 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 & n.28
(1963); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); California v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 495 (1962).
98. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 & n.29 (1963);
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
99. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); see Handler, supra
note 89, at 1379.
100. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 845 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Handler, supra note 89,
at 1379. Compare Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (exemption
analysis of federal antitrust and securities laws) with Exxon v. Governor of Mary-
land, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (preemption analysis of state retail gasoline regulatory
statute and Robinson-Patman Act).
101. See Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp.
37, 42 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("[p]reemption analysis involves by its very nature the
problem of federalism .. "); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives
on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
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emption analysis are effectively reversed in preemption analysis.
10 2
Exercise of federal preemption is not likely to be presumed. 103 This
rule of statutory construction applies with added vigor when states or
municipalities act in furtherance of public health, safety and wel-
fare. 104
State or municipal enactments are preempted under the supremacy
clause 105 when they (1) actually conflict with federal statutes 10 or (2)
purport to act in a field exclusively occupied by federal legislation. 1
07
Local regulation actually conflicting in terms, but not with the pur-
pose of federal enactments have been upheld under preemption analy-
sis.' 08 Notwithstanding pointed criticism, 10 this approach represents
102. See Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 846-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Handler, supra
note 89, at 1379; compare note 97 supra (antitrust exemption strongly disfavored)
with note 103 infra (preemption not likely to be presumed).
103. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S.
311, 317 (1981) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142 (1963)); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978);
New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)); see Note, Parker v. Brown: A
Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1171 (1975) (federal courts should be
reluctant to preempt state policy).
104. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940); Kelly v. Washington, 302
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1937); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474
F. Supp. 37, 42 (N.D. Tex. 1979); see Note, supra note 101, at 627.
105. See note 151 infra.
106. Actual conflict occurs when (1) compliance with both statutory schemes is a
physical impossibility, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963) (state fruit classification not preempted); see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158-60 (1978) (state pilotage regulation on registered/non-
coastwise traffic not preempted); Federal Power Comm'n v. Corporation Comm'n of
Oklahoma, 362 F. Supp. 522, 538-40 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (state natural gas price
regulation preempted) or (2) the state/municipal enactment stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of federal objectives; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941); see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (quoting Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)), 546 (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912))
(1977) (state flour labeling requirements preempted); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S.
637, 649 (1971). In Perez, the Court stated that conflict analysis is "essentially a two-
step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then deter-
mining the constitutional question whether they are in conflict." Id. at 644.
107. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., the Court stated that the congressional
intent to occupy a field may be evidenced by (1) scope of regulation, (2) dominant
federal regulatory interest and (3) state laws producing results inconsistent with
federal purpose. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). It has been suggested that Rice indicates
that strictly defined legislative intent "is an inadequate source for the decision of
preemption questions." Note, supra note 101, at 634.
108. See, e.g., Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S.
117, 130-31 (1973) (state law prohibiting contract provisions restraining practice in a
lawful profession not preempted by NYSE arbitration rules); Huron Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960) (municipal smoke abatement
ordinance not preempted by federal ship inspection laws). Recently, the Court
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the trend in the law." 0 Thus, it appears that local regulation seeking
to advance public health, safety and welfare, rather than to frustrate
competition, would not actually conflict with the federal antitrust
laws. I I"
To preempt an exercise of state police power, 1 2 courts must deter-
mine a clear and manifest congressional purpose to supercede state
law in the field. 1 3 This stringent 1 4 standard requires (1) express
congressional preemptive language or (2) exclusive," 15 not merely per-
implicitly approved this purpose approach. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 165 (1978) (factually distinguished Huron rather than repudiate purpose ap-
proach).
109. The Court in Perez, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), condemned the purpose approach
as "abberrational," fearing that this approach would "enable state legislatures to
nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative
committee report articulating some state interest or policy-other than frustration of
the federal objective-that would be tangentially furthered by the proposed state
law." Id. at 652; see Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 612-13
(1926).
110. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1978); Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Tully, 639 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981); Synercom
Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 40 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (dicta); see generally Note, supra note 101, at 647.
111. Compare Seagram & Sons Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966) (state
statute requiring private parties to compile price information not preempted as it
does not place irresistible pressure on private parties to violate Sherman Act) with
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951) (state
regulation preempted as it compels private anticompetitive conduct condemned by
the antitrust laws); see Handler, supra note 89, at 1382.
112. A valid exercise of the police power is (1) related to the public health, safety
or morals, (2) reasonable, (3) not arbitrary, and (4) rationally related to the pur-
ported evil being remedied. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896); Lowton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
113. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (municipal noise ordinance);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1963); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912); Reid
v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902).
114. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 545 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). The Court has suggested in dictum that federal preemption of states in the
exercise of their police power may be limited to actual conflict situations. Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 12 (1937) (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
115. The Court has recognized that the comprehensiveness of federal regulation
may indicate the complexity of subject matter rather than preemptive intent. De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976) (federal immigraton laws do not preempt
state restrictions on employing illegal aliens); New York Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973) (state employment assistance program only parti-
ally preempted by federal scheme). The Dublino Court also looked to extrinsic
facts-state practice at the time the federal legislation was passed-in determining
legislative intent. Id. at 414. Since 21 states had provisions at that time similar to the
one challenged in Dublino, the Court concluded that preemptive intent "would in all
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vasive,1 6 federal regulation in the field. Absent this showing, the local
regulation resists federal preemption.
It has been judicially determined that Congress exerted its full
commerce power in enacting the Sherman Act,11 7 and that the statute
is nearly constitutional in its breadth. 118 It may be argued, therefore,
that all state and municipal enactments not otherwise constitutionally
protected' 19 are preempted by the Sherman Act. However, the Court
rejected an analogous argument in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Mary-
land. 120 In Exxon, a state statute prohibited gasoline producers and oil
refiners from operating retail service stations within the state and
required a uniform extension of temporary price reductions granted to
independent retailers. It was argued that the state program was pre-
empted 12 1 as it had an anticompetitive effect inconsistent with the
central policy of the Sherman Act.122 Refusing to construe preemptive
congressional intent from the "broad implications" of the antitrust
laws, the Court upheld the state law. 2 3 Reflecting concerns similar to
those expressed in Parker, Justice Stevens stated, "if an adverse effect
on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute
invalid, the State's power to engage in economic regulation would be
effectively destroyed." 12 4 Thus, Exxon indicates that a rather explicit
manifestation of congressional intent is necessary to preempt local
government regulation with acknowledged anticompetitive effects.
Since Parker involved the conflicting enactments of two distinct
sovereigns, 25 it is more appropriately viewed as a preemption deci-
likelihood have been expressed in direct and unambiguous language." Id. Addition-
ally, the Court considered the limited funding level and operational scope of the
federal regulatory scheme in determining a nonexclusive legislative intent. Id. at 417.
116. In the following cases, the Court has focused on the pervasive nature of
federal regulation as evidencing congressional intent to occupy the field. See, e.g.,
Chicago & North Western Trans. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318
(1981) (railroads); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,
633 (1973) (airport noise); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) (immigra-
tion); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926) (railroads).
117. See note 215 infra.
118. See note 215 infra and accompanying text.
119. The tenth amendment is the likely source of protection. See National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845, 851-52 (1976).
120. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
121. Id. at 122 n.5 (arguably preempted by Robinson-Patman Price Discrimina-
tion Act and the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973).
122. Id. at 133.
123. Id. at 133-34.
124. Id. at 133; cf. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 102 S. Ct. 3294, 3299 (1982)
(anticompetitive effect insufficient to preempt state statute), citing Seagram & Sons
Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966) (state law requiring wholesalers and
retailers to file price information with state agency not preempted).
125. In Parker, the California state raisin prorate program ostensibly conflicted
with the federal Sherman Act. 317 U.S. at 350.
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sion.126 The Parker Court's reliance on preemption precedents12 7 and
presumptions 128 supports this conclusion. In subsequent decisions, a
majority of the Justices have adopted expressly the preemption formu-
lation of the Parker doctrine.129 Thus, the Court's reliance on exemp-
tion principles in Cantor130 and City of Lafayette13' was misplaced.
Preemption analysis of anticompetitive municipal enactments facil-
itates affording local governments appropriate federal deference. Un-
der conflict analysis, municipal enactments seeking to advance public
health, safety and welfare-rather than to frustrate competition-
would resist federal preemption. However, local regulation merely
authorizing private anticompetitive conduct remains subject to fed-
eral preemption. 32 The presumption against federal preemption and
the resulting judicial reluctance to preempt local regulation with
acknowledged anticompetitive effects indicate that federal intent to
occupy exclusively the field is unlikely to be inferred from the procom-
petitive policies embodied in the antitrust laws.
IV. Reformulating Boulder: A Proposed Qualified
Municipal Antitrust Exemption
A. Introduction
The City of Lafayette plurality concluded that states and munici-
palities are not equivalent under the Parker doctrine. 133 Central to this
conclusion was the plurality's recognition that municipalities receive
less federal deference than states. 134 By implicitly equating municipal-
ities and private parties,135 Boulder indicates that a more appropriate
126. This conclusion is supported by the commentators. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 212(a) (1978); Handler, supra note 89, at 1378; Posner,
The Proper Relationship between State Regulation and the Antitrust Laws, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 733-34 (1973) (proposes a nonstatutory injunction, implicitly
based on preemption analysis, to avoid state treble damage liability); Verkuil, Pre-
emption oJ State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DuKE L.J. 225, 227.
127. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 339 (1904) (Court framed issue as whether
state pilotage laws were void because they conflicted with Acts of Congress) (cited in
Parker, 317 U.S. at 352).
128. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 ("an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress").
129. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 846-47 (Rehnquist, Burger and O'Connor, JJ., dissent-
ing); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 607 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); id. at 618 (Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
130. See note 88 supra.
131. See note 88 supra.
132. See note 111 supra.
133. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 60 supra,
135. See notes 80-87 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. XI
19821 MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY 69
comparison is between municipalities and private parties, rather than
between municipalities and states, as in City of Lafayette. Conse-
quently, the Boulder standard is fully justifiable only if municipalities
receive no more federal deference than private parties. Municipalities
do, however, receive this federal deference. It is expressed not only in
constitutional limitations of congressional power, 136 but also in legisla-
tion reflecting these limitations. 137 Thus, a withdrawal from the Boul-
der standard in the form of a qualified exemption is required.
B. Constitutionally Based Distinctions
1. Limitations on Federal Commerce Power
State sovereignty imposes an affirmative limitation on Congress'
plenary commerce power 138 as applied to states and municipalities.139
Although the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act 40 (FLSA) apply to private employers, 141
extension of these provisions 42 to state and municipal employers was
held unconstitutional in National League of Cities v. Usery. '43 There,
136. See notes 138-68 infra and accompanying text (constitutional limitation on
exercise of federal commerce and taxing power as applied to state subdivisions).
137. See notes 175-206 infra and accompanying text (federal legislation granting
municipalities preferential treatment as compared to private parties).
138. See note 29 supra.
139. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-56 (1976) (overruling
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholds FLSA extension to state school and
hospital employees)); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 555-57 (1975) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (upholds temporary wage freeze on state employees' salaries); see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 311-15 (1978). The Court in National
League of Cities expressly equated states and municipalities in its limitation of the
federal commerce power by stating "[i]nterference with integral governmental serv-
ices provided by such subordinate arms of a state government [are] therefore beyond
the reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause just as if such services
were provided by the State itself." 426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
140. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1976).
141. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941) (unanimous deci-
sion) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)).
142. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55
(amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 1-19, 52 Stat. 1060
(1938)), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-218 (1976).
143. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Prior to National League of Cities, the Court indicated
that the tenth amendment merely announces the relationship between the federal
and state governments. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124 ("[t]he [tenth] amendment states but
a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered"). For over forty years
preceding its decision in National League of Cities, the Court did not utilize the tenth
amendment as an affirmative limitation on the commerce power. See, e.g., Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1972) (upholds temporary state employee wage freeze).
As the Court in National League of Cities indicated in dictum, 426 U.S. at 852 n. 17,
854 n. 18, this decision did not limit federal legislative powers under the spending
clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1; see North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp.
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the Court observed that, in addition to straining state and municipal
treasuries, 144 compliance with FLSA provisions (1) displaces state poli-
cies regarding the manner in which governmental services will be
delivered and (2) "restructure[s] traditional ways in which the local
governments have arranged their affairs."'1 4 The Court held that
Congress exceeded its commerce power when it enacted legislation
directly displacing state and municipal freedom to "structure integral
operations in areas of traditional government functions .... ,146
Therefore, exercise of Congress' commerce power, although valid as
applied to private parties, may violate principles of federalism when
applied to states and their political subdivisions. 47
532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), affd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978) (federal health care aid may
be conditioned on prescribed minimum standards), § 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56
(1976) (federal courts may assess money damages against states engaging in sex
discrimination) or the war powers provision, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1, 11-15; see
Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1082 (5th Cir. 1.979) (state required
to reinstate employee discharged because he was absent from work due to military
service).
144. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846.
145. Id. at 849.
146. Id. at 852. Justice Blackmun limited the plurality opinion by interpreting it
as requiring a balancing approach. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This
approach upholds federal legislation operating in areas "where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with the imposed federal
standards would be essential." Id. This balancing test has been applied by lower
courts in upholding federal legislation regarding environmental protection. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195, 1205 (6th Cir. 1980);
SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 975, 984 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (preempts
municipal ordinance regulating P.C.B. storage); United States v. Duracell Int'l, Inc.,
510 F. Supp. 154, 156 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). The Court, however, has recently supple-
mented the balancing approach with a three-part conjunctive test. Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 & n.29 (1981)
(balancing approach comes into play only after the three threshold requirements
have been satisfied); see Comment, The Supreme Court Rejects Constitutional Chal-
lenges to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 48 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 137, 151-59 (1981).
147. Compare United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (private employers)
with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426, U.S. 833 (1976) (state and municipal
employers). There are strong arguments that denial of a qualified municipal exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws unconstitutionally interferes with municipal operations.
Compliance with the Boulder standard, requiring clear articulation and active state
supervision, frustrates state delegation of governmental powers to its political subdi-
visions. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see City of Lafayette,
435 U.S. at 434-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Comment, National League of Cities
and the Parker Doctrine: The Status of State Sovereignty Under the Commerce
Clause, 8 FORDHAM UR. L.J. 301, 335-36 (1980). Since delegation reflects state
policy on how to structure the delivery of basic services, it is arguable that such
delegation is constitutionally protected under National League of Cities. Bangasser,
Exposure of Municipal Corporations to Liability for Violations of the Antitrust Laws:
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2. Doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity
Municipalities receive a qualified nonstatutory 48 immunity from
federal taxation. This immunity arises by implication rather than
from any express constitutional provision. 4 The doctrine of intergov-
ernmental tax immunity was first formulated in McCulloch v. Mary-
land. 150 Relying on the supremacy clause,' 51 the Supreme Court inval-
idated a discriminatory Maryland stamp tax on notes of banks
chartered by the United States.152 McCulloch indicates that federal
immunity from state taxation rests on federal supremacy. 5 3 Subse-
Antitrust Immunity after the City of Lafayette Decision, 11 URB. LAW. vii (1979);
Rogers, supra note 28, at 341; Note, Municipal Activities, supra note 4, at 524.
Moreover, the Boulder standard exposes municipalities to potentially devastating
treble damage liability. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (failure to satisfy exemption requirements exposes municipalities to treble
damage liability); Cantor, 428 U.S. at 615 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (nonexempt
public utilities subject to treble damage liability). When treble damages are so large
that they strain municipal resources, thereby causing substantial interference with
the delivery and structure of traditional government functions, such damages violate
state sovereignty. Note, Municipal Activities, supra note 4, at 547. Relief is required
before liability is imposed because the judiciary lacks the discretion to deny treble
damages on a case-by-case basis when state sovereignty would be violated. See note
209 infra.
148. See notes 155 & 168 infra and accompanying text. Municipalities also benefit
from statutory exemptions from income taxation. 26 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (1976) (ex-
cludes from gross income all income derived from any public utility or exercise of any
essential government function); id. § 103(a)(1) (excludes from gross income interest
on the obligations of a political subdivision). Since considerable controversy exists as
to whether these statutory exemptions are constitutionally compelled, see notes 202 &
205-06 infra and accompanying text, they will be discussed separately. See notes 202-
06 infra and accompanying text.
149. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575 (1946) (state sale of mineral
water not immune); Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439, 452
(1938) (admission charge to state university athletic event not immune); Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 424 (1938) (income of state agents not immune); Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 123-27 (1870) (income of state judicial officer immune);
California v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 21, 26 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (state agents not
immune from federal tax on air travel); City of New York v. United States, 394 F.
Supp. 641, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (city employees traveling on official business not
immune from air transportation excise tax).
150. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
151. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... "U.S. CONST.
art. VI, § 2.
152. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 433.
153. Id. See Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 221-22
(1928); Farmers and Mechanics Sav. Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U.S. 516, 521 (1914);
Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 448, 468 (1829); see also Rakestraw, The
Reciprocal Rule of Governmental Tax Immunity-A Legal Myth, 3 OKLA. L. REv.
131, 137 (1950).
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quent decisions based the federal immunity also upon the practical
necessity of maintaining a dual system of government with overlap-
ping tax jurisdictions. 5 4 Applying the federalism rationale, the Su-
preme Court later extended the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity to states and their instrumentalities.155
State immunity from federal taxation was once reciprocal and coex-
tensive with that enjoyed by the federal government from state taxa-
tion.156 The decrease in federal tax jurisdiction and revenue sources
resulting from this broad state immunity caused substantial judicial
concern.15 7 In responding to this concern, courts sought to articulate a
standard limiting state and municipal tax immunity while preserving
the operation of these governmental units in our federal system.'5 8 In
South Carolina v. United States,15 9 the Court set forth a standard that
154. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936); Helvering v.
Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 225 (1934); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 126
(1870); Comment, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities: An Analysis and Suggested
Approach to the Doctrine and Its Application to State and Municipal Bond Interest,
15 VILL. L. REV. 414, 416 (1970).
155. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 123-27 (1870) (salary of state
judicial officer, an instrumentality for carrying out government powers, is exempt
from federal income tax). Collector was effectively overruled by Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) in which the Court reasoned that the
burden on the federal government, imposed by increasing labor prices, was too
indirect and incidental to constitute an unconstitutional interference with govern-
mental operations. Id. at 487.
156. See, e.g., Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 575 (1931)
(municipal police department immune from federal excise tax); Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 522 (1926) (engineers employed by states or their subdivisions
on a noncontinuous basis not exempt from federal income tax).
157. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 455-60 (1978) (scope of state
immunity should not extend beyond that necessary to protect state's ability to deliver
traditional government services); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 584
(1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,
483 (1939); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 416-17 (1938); South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905). Since members of Congress are chosen by
state constituencies, political accountability restrains abusive federal taxing of the
states. By contrast, federal citizens who are not residents of the state imposing the tax
against a federal instrumentality have no political redress. See Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 456-57 n.13 (1978); New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
at 577, (quoting Collector, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 128-29 (Bradley, J., dissenting));
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. at 412; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 435-36. In addition, the Court was reluctant to confer advantages on government
bodies competing with private businesses. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. at
584 (Rutledge, J., concurring); Helvering v. Gerhardt; 304 U.S. at 421.
158. In New York v. United States, Justice Frankfurter observed that "[i]n the
older cases the emphasis was on immunity from taxation. The whole tendency of
recent cases reveals a shift in emphasis to that of limitation upon immunity." 326
U.S. at 581.
159. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
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essentially distinguishes activities usually carried on by private parties
from those normally engaged in by governmental entities. 160 In hold-
ing that state instrumentalities distributing liquor were subject to
federal taxation, the Court stated that "the exemption of state agen-
cies and instrumentalities from National taxation is limited to those
which are of a strictly governmental character, and does not extend to
those which are used by the State in the carrying on of an ordinary
private business."'' For over forty years, the Court struggled with
variations on this distinction162 before discarding it in New York v.
United States16 3 wherein the Court upheld a federal excise tax on the
state sale of mineral water. The state's argument that it was exercising
the governmental function of natural response disposal was unavailing
as the Court rejected the government-proprietary distinction as "un-
tenable." 16 4
Three separate opinions were filed in New York v. United States. 
65
The Court opinion, written by Justice Frankfurter on behalf of him-
self and Justice Rutledge, maintained that states and their instrumen-
talities are immune from discriminatory taxes only.' By contrast, the
160. In developing this distinction, the Court analogized state immunity from
taxation to its immunity from tort liability. Id. at 463; see also Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911). This analogy was subsequently rejected because of the
differing objectives of taxation and tort recovery and because taxation is a matter of
federal law while tort law is a matter of local law. City of Trenton v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 182, 192 (1923).
161. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 461 (1905).
162. See, e.g., Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439, 451
(1938) (admission charge to athletic event comparable to those "usually conducted by
private owners" not immune from federal tax); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405,
416-17 (1938) (suggesting in dictum that essential government operations qualifying
for immunity should be those exercised by local governments at the time the Consti-
tution was adopted); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 225 (1934) (state railroad
trustee's salary taxable as such an enterprise is a "departure from usual government
functions"); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 368 (1934) (state liquor sale not a
governmental function exempt from federal excise tax); Indian Motorcycle Co. v.
United States, 283 U.S. 570, 576 (1931) (municipal police department immune from
federal excise tax); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911) (only those
functions a local government can do itself are immune).
163. 326 U.S. 572, 580-83 (1946).
164. Id. at 583. Justice Frankfurter elaborated, "[t]o rest the federal taxing power
on what is 'normally' conducted by private enterprise in contradiction to the 'usual'
governmental functions is too shifting a basis for determining constitutional power
and too entangled in expediency to serve as a dependable legal criterion." Id. at 580.
165. Justice Frankfurter announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion
joined only by Justice Rutledge. Chief Justice Stone concurred in the result in an
opinion joined by Justices Reed, Murphy and Burton. Justice Douglas dissented in an
opinion joined by Justice Black. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration of
the case.
166. 326 U.S. at 582. Justice Frankfurter noted the recent judicial trend narrow-
ing state immunity, reflecting the fiscal and political concerns associated with state
immunity. Id. at 581; see note 157 supra and accompanying text.
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majority of Justices held that a nondiscriminatory federal tax may
unconstitutionally interfere with the sovereign functions of state gov-
ernment. 16 7 The majority, however, failed to articulate an alternative
standard delineating the scope of state immunity from federal taxa-
tion. Their rejection of the discrimination test indicates that a consti-
tutional immunity from federal taxation exists in favor of states and
municipalities and that this immunity does not extend to private
parties. 18
3. Collateral Areas of the Law
Federal legislation in (1) bankruptcy, 9 (2) securities regulation, 170
(3) labor relations,' 7 ' (4) price discrimination, 72 and (5) taxation173
indicates that municipalities receive more federal deference than do
private parties. Such legislation reflects federal reluctance to interfere
with municipal fiscal and governmental affairs. 74
167. 326 U.S. at 586-87 (Stone, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Reed, Murphy
and Burton). In his dissent, Justice Douglas rejected the nondiscrimination test as it
"disregards the Tenth Amendment, places the sovereign States on the same plane as
private citizens, and makes the sovereign States pay the federal government for the
privilege of exercising the powers of sovereignty guaranteed them by the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 596 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Black). The Court
recently rendered a contrary interpretation of this decision in Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 457-58 & n.15 (1978) where they upheld a nondiscrimi-
natory registration fee applied to state aircraft used for police functions. The Court
concluded that the four concurring Justices in New York v. United States upheld the
federal tax on the grounds that it was nondiscriminatory. Id. at 458-59. This strained
reading of New York v. United States ignores the concurring Justices' observation
"that a federal tax which is not discriminatory ... may nevertheless so affect the
State, merely because it is a State that is being taxed, as to interfere unduly with the
State's performance of its sovereign functions of government." 326 U.S. at 587
(Stone, C.J., concurring).
168. See note 167 supra and accompanying text (nondiscriminatory federal tax on
states or their instrumentalities may be unconstitutional). But see Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461-62 (1972) (indicating nondiscriminatory tax may be
constitutionally applied to state and its subdivisions but refusing to address vitality of
state tax immunity).
169. See notes 178-80 infra and accompanying text (municipal debt adjustment
may only be brought voluntarily and with state approval).
170. See notes 187-91 infra and accompanying text (municipalities exempt from
civil liability for securities registration violations).
171. See notes 193-95 infra and accompanying text (municipalities generally ex-
empt from federal labor regulations).
172. See notes 197-98 infra and accompanying text (government purchasers ex-
empt from Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act).
173. See notes 202-04 infra and accompanying text (municipal income from exer-
cise of essential governmental function and bond interest exempt).
174. Such reluctance is manifested by federal legislation in the following areas:
bankruptcy, see notes 178-80 & 183 infra, securities regulation, see note 191 infra,
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Bankruptcy proceedings against a private debtor under Chapter 7
of the Federal Bankruptcy Code may be initiated by a creditor with-
out a debtor's consent.1 75 In addition, a private debtor's assets must be
effectively applied to his debts. 17 Application of similar provisions 77
to municipalities unconstitutionally interferes with state sover-
eignty.1 78 Accordingly, Chapter 9 proceedings for municipal debt
adjustment may be brought only (1) voluntarily by the municipal
debtor17 and (2) pursuant to an affirmative authorization under state
law.180 Moreover, there is no liquidation of assets or creation of a
labor relations, see note 195 infra, price discrimination, see note 200 infra, and
taxation, see notes 202 & 204 infra.
175. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1978) (provides basis for private creditor voluntarily initiat-
ing proceeding); see Newhouse v. Corcoran Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690, 690-91
(9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 717 (1941) (court refused to apply private
bankruptcy principles to a state subdivision).
176. 114 F.2d at 690.
177. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, §§ 78-80, 48 Stat. 798 (1934 Code).
178. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S.
513, 530 (1936) (restriction of municipal debtors' control over fiscal affairs violates
state sovereignty). In 1937, Congress enacted a modified municipal bankruptcy code,
Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653 (1937 Code). While retaining the basic
procedural framework, the 1937 Code deleted a provision in the 1934 Code which
vested general bankruptcy powers in the federal courts analogous to those available
in private bankrupticies. See 48 Stat. 798 § 80(i) (deleted provision). Furthermore,
the 1937 Act expressly provided that nothing contained therein should be construed
as limiting state control of municipalities in the exercise of their political or govern-
mental powers. 50 Stat. 654, 659 § 83(i); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 904(1) (current Code
contains similar limitation). Emphasizing that Congress was "especially solicitous" to
avoid interference with municipal fiscal affairs and autonomy, the Court in United
States v. Bekins upheld the 1937 Code. 304 U.S. 27, 49-51 (1938); see Faitoute Iron &
Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1942) (reiterates concern for
preserving municipal autonomy and fiscal integrity); Note, Municipal Bankruptcy,
the Tenth Amendment and The New Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1871, 1896-98
(1976) (reviews judicial interpretations of 1934 and 1937 Codes).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (adopts only voluntary provi-
sions); 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (Supp. 111978) (Chapter 9 debtor must "desire to effect
a plan to adjust such debts"). H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, Pts. I and 11
(1973) (involuntary proceedings are neither feasible nor desirable and are of suspect
constitutionality); see United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938) (voluntary
provision avoids undue interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs of a
political subdivision).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (1976 & Supp. 111978). The legislative history of this section
clearly indicates that the courts may not interfere with a municipality's choice of
essential services: "[§ 903] sets forth the primary authority of a State, through its
constitution, laws and other powers, over its municipalities. . . . In light of the
recent Supreme Court case, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
maximum flexibility for the states in solving the debt problems of their municipalities
is advisable." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 397-98 (1977); see Fippinger,
Securities Law Disclosure Requirements for the Political Subdivision Threatened
with Bankruptcy, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 555-57 & n.82 (1982).
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fictional debtor's estate as in a Chapter 7 proceeding.' 8' Thus, the
present bankruptcy code 8 2 defers to principles of federalism 83 in its
provisions concerning municipal debt adjustment.
Under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),' 84 municipal securities
are exempt from registration 85 but remain subject to the antifraud
provisions. 86 Civil liability may not be imposed upon municipal issu-
ers for (1) false statements or omissions in the registration statement 87
or (2) improprieties concerning prospectuses and other communica-
tions. 18 Therefore, antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act may only be
enforced against municipal issuers by injunctions or criminal prosecu-
tion. "'89 Similarly, municipal issuers may not be held liable under the
181. In re North and South Shenango Joint Mun. Auth., 14 Bankr. 414, 420
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981); Fippinger, supra note 180, at 552-53 ("[c]hapter 9 contem-
plates the maintenance of public property for public purposes as well as decisions
made by public officials, not by private trustees"); J. MAcLACHLIN, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 2 (1956).
182. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (Supp. 11 1978).
183. Regarding municipal debt adjustment, "[b]oth Congress and the Supreme
Court have . . . been careful to stress that the federal municipal Bankruptcy Act is
not in any way intended to infringe on the sovereign power of a state to control its
political subdivisions; for . . . to the extent that the federal Bankruptcy Act does
infringe on a state or municipality's function it is unconstitutional." Ropico, Inc. v.
City of New York, 425 F. Supp. 970, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). One commentator stated
that "[t]here is no infringement upon the sovereignty of a state over its political
subdivisions so long as the state may in some way effectively prevent federal interfer-
ence in the internal fiscal management of the state...." Note, A Survey of Munici-
pal Bankruptcy Law and Procedure, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 478, 485 (1971). Section
903 of the Code provides states with such control. See note 180 supra and accompa-
nying text.
184. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The 1933 Act seeks to promote full and fair
disclosure and prevent fraud in sales of securities in interstate commerce and through
the mails. 48 Stat. at 74.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976) (registration requirement); 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976)
(registration exemption for governmental issuers). The definition of "political subdi-
visions" exempted from securities registration under the 1933 Act corresponds to that
of governmental units exempted from federal income taxation. H.R. REP. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933). This definitional symmetry reflects federal legislative
concern to avoid "any constitutional difficulties that might arise with reference to the
inclusion of state and municipal obligations [under the securities laws]. Id.; see
Fippinger, supra note 180, at 544-45 n. 14.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)( 2) (1976); see In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F.
Supp. 169, 181 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (antifraud provisions in 1933 Act are the only
ones that apply to governmental issuers) [hereinafter cited as Securities Litigation];
see Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (registration compliance does not
insure antifraud compliance).
187. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(1)-(a)(4) (1976).
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
189. Securities Litigation, 507 F. Supp. at 181 n.26; Fippinger, supra note 180, at
548; see 15 U.S.C. § 77(t) (1976) (confers SEC with injunctive powers); 15 U.S.C. §
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Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)' 90 antifraud provi-
sions.'"" Hence, congressional reluctance to interfere with municipal
fiscal affairs through securities regulation is evident in both the 1933
Act and the 1934 Act.
In its regulation of labor relations, Congress fully asserts its com-
merce power. 92 However, state political subdivisions receive exemp-
tions from federal labor laws.19 3 These exemptions arise from the
77x (1976) (criminal sanctions). The constitutionality of SEC enforcement actions
against municipal issuers remains to be established conclusively. See City of Philadel-
phia v. SEC, 434 F. Supp. 281, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1977), appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978) (court avoided considering constitutionality of
formal SEC investigation on ripeness grounds); see also Note, Federal Securities
Fraud Liability and Municipal Issuers; Implications of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1064, 1071-74 (1977) (suggests constitutional limitation on
enforcing antifraud provisions on municipalities for disclosures to the general pub-
lic).
190. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The 1934 Act Was designed to
prevent inequitable and unfair practices through the regulation of securities ex-
changes and over the counter markets. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 1(1934).
191. Securities Litigation, 507 F. Supp. at 186 (municipal securities market, but
not municipal issuers themselves, subject to regulation); Woods v. Homes and Struc-
tures of Pittsburg, 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1281 (D. Kan. 1980) (notes reluctance to
subject government issuers to civil liability). Earlier cases relied primarily on the
definition of "person" under the 1934 Act in holding municipalities not liable. See,
e.g., Greenspan v. Crosbie, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP'. (CCH)
95,780 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig., 416 F.
Supp. 161, 198 (C.D. Cal. 1976). In 1975, Congress amended the definition of
"person" under the 1934 Act to expressly include municipalities. Pub. L. 94-29, § 3
(2), 89 Stat. 97 (1975), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1976). Emphasizing that the Tower
Amendments, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (1976) (exempts municipal issuers from disclosure
requirements), were designed to ensure that the amended 1934 Act would "not
tamper in any way with the perogatives of state and local governments in their sale of
securities," 121 CONG. REC. 6188 (1975) (remarks of Senator Williams), the court in
Securities Litigation held that municipal issuers remained not subject to the antifraud
provisions. 507 F. Supp. at 184 (1975 amendments exempt municipal issuers while
subjecting others in municipal securities market to regulation); cf. Ohio v. Crofters,
525 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (Congress intended to exclude govern-
ments from liability for violations of the 1934 Act).
192. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 567 (1942) ("the purpose of
[FLSAI was to extend federal control in this field to the farthest reaches of interstate
commerce").
193. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) (Wagner Act excludes state political
subdivisions from term "employer"); 29 U.S.C. § 142(3) (1976) (Taft-Hartley Act).
An exempted "political subdivision" must be (1) created directly by the state so as to
constitute a department or administrative arm of the government and (2) adminis-
tered by individuals responsible to public officials or the general electorate. NLRB v.
Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1971). Compare Truman Medical
Center v. NLRB, 239 N.L.R.B. 1067, enforced, 641 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1981)
(state created medical center not exempt from NLRB jurisdiction) with Board of
Trustees of the Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177, 184 (10th Cir. 1980)
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denial of government employees' right to strike or bargain collec-
tively. 19 4 This denial reflects federal legislative deference to state sov-
ereignty. 9 5 No corresponding exemption protects private employers as
their coverage under the federal labor laws raises no tenth amend-
ment implications.
Unlike private parties, 96 government agencies are not subject to the
proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act 197 when making purchases
for traditional governmental purposes.9 8 This statutory interpreta-
tion, made in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association v. Abbott
Laboratories,19 was heavily influenced by "tenth amendment impli-
cations. '20 0 The court interpreted the Act as not requiring governmen-
tal agencies to pay minimum prices for goods comparable to those
charged to private parties.2 0 '
Municipal income derived from the exercise of any essential govern-
ment function is exempt from federal taxation.20 2 In 1895, the Court
(publicly operated hospital exempt from NLRB jurisdiction). If private employers do
not retain "sufficient control over their employment relationship[s] to engage in
meaningful collective bargaining" then they may become exempt under the aegis of
the political subdivision whom they serve. R.W. Harmon & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 664
F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir. 1981); National Transp. Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 565
(1979) (Board abandons "intimate connection" with political subdivision require-
ment); see NLRB v. Austin Dev. Center, 606 F.2d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1979) ("inti-
mate connection" was discretionary rather than statutory limitation on Board's juris-
diction).
194. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 604 n.3 (1971).
195. Crilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 529 F.2d 1355, 1360 (3d Cir.
1976). The Constitutional basis of this federal deference was illustrated in National
League of Cities where extension of federal minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions to nearly all state and municipal employees was held to be an unconstitu-
tional infringement on state sovereignty. See text accompanying notes 138-47 supra.
196..Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1 (1976)
(drug manufacturer may not sell to nongovernmental nonprofit hospitals at a lower
price than to private retailers).
197. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976) (proscribes anticompetitive price discrimi-
nation not justified by cost differentials).
198. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 656 F.2d 92,
102 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1629 (1982).
199. Id. Nonprofit hospitals, operated by state subdivisions, purchased drugs at
prices below those charged to private retailers. These drugs were subsequently sold in
hospital pharmacies which compete with private retailers.
200. Id. at 99.
201. Id. at 102-03 (relying on National League of Cities).
202. 26 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (1976) (income derived from any public utility or the
exercise of any essential government function is statutorily exempt from state and
municipal gross income). This statutory exemption codifies at least partially the
constitutional immunity as it existed when the statute was originally enacted in 1913.
Tucker & Rumbro, State Immunity from Federal Taxation: The Need for Reexami-
nation, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 501,514 (1975). To the extent that the constitutional
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held that federal taxation of municipal bond interest unconstitution-
ally burdens municipal borrowing power.2 0 3 The Internal Revenue
Code reflects this holding by excluding municipal bond interest from
gross income. 20 4 Despite its present questionable constitutional ba-
sis, 20 5 numerous legislative attempts to abolish this exemption have
been unsuccessful. 206
C. Consequences of Denying a Qualified Municipal Exemption
Failure to extend a qualified exemption to municipalities subjects
these governmental entities to scrutiny under substantive antitrust
law. The Supreme Court's decision in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States207 prohibits inquiry, apart from the com-
petitive effect, of municipal policies.2 08 Professional Engineers pro-
immunity has contracted since that time, compare South Carolina v. United States,
199 U.S. 437, 461 (1905) (state functions immune only if strictly governmental in
character) with New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 581 (1946) (state clearly
immune from discriminatory tax), the statutory exemption is correspondingly less
constitutionally based. Tucker & Rumbro, supra, at 521, 525.
203. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing,
158 U.S. 601 (1895).
204. "Gross income does not include interest on ... the obligations of a state...
or any political subdivision .. " 26 U.S.C. § 103(a)(1) (1976).
205. The prevailing view is that this exemption is constitutionally based in the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,
FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 115-19 (9th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as BOND
FUNDAMENTALS]; Comment, Tax Exempt State and Local Bonds: Form of Intergov-
ernmental Immunity and Form of Intergovernmental Obligation, 21 DEPAUL L.
REV. 757, 772 (1972) (relying on Pollock). Opponents argue that the erosion of the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity confers the federal government with
power to tax municipal bond interest. See, e.g., Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax
Immunities in the United States, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 305, 332 (1953) (§ 103 is not
constitutionally compelled); Tucker & Rumbro, supra note 202, at 507 & n.42
(same); Comment, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities: An Analysis and Suggested
Approach to the Doctrine and Its Application to State and Municipal Bond Interest,
15 VILL. L. REV. 414, 437 (1970) (same) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Municipal
Bond Interest]. It has also been argued that the sixteenth amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI (Congress has power to tax income from any source without apportion-
ment) (enacted after Pollock decision), renders municipal bond interest subject to
federal taxation. See, e.g., BOND FUNDAMENTALS, supra, at 116.
206. BOND FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 205, at 118. Direct federal subsidies as an
alternative to the exemption was proposed in a 1969 House Bill, H.R. REP. No. 413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 1645,
1825. Expressing reluctance to interfere with the municipal bond market, the Senate
deleted the proposal from the final bill. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2029.
207. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
208. Id. at 692. Professional Engineers involved a challenge to a professional code
prohibiting competitive bidding among engineers. The defendant argued that price
competition adversely affected engineering quality and ultimately, public safety.
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hibits municipalities from defending an antitrust challenge on grounds
that the benefits of the restraint, measured in terms of public health,
safety and welfare, outweigh its anticompetitive harms. 20 1 Municipal-
ities often pursue governmental policy objectives unrelated to compe-
tition.2 10 Hence, substantive antitrust law is ill-suited to evaluate mu-
nicipal policies. 21
The Court concluded that public safety is irrelevant as "the purpose of [antitrust]
analysis is to form a judgment about competitive significance of the restraint; it is not
to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the
interest of the members of an industry." Id. Thus, the Court expressly limited
substantive antitrust inquiry to the competitive effects of the challenged conduct.
209. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although many com-
mentators advocate limiting remedies for municipal antitrust violations to injunctive
relief, see, e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 126, at § 217; Posner, supra note
126, at 727; Note, Antitrust Treble Damages as Applied to Local Government
Entities: Does the Punishment Fit the Defendant?, 1980 ARiz. ST. L.J. 411, 420-24;
Comment, supra note 13, at 581, the remedies stage is also unsuitable for recognizing
the public benefit conferred by municipalities. The statutory language is mandatory
and unambiguous. See note 10 supra (quotes §15 of Clayton Act). Congress has
repeatedly rejected proposals to make treble damages discretionary. City of Lafay-
ette, 435 U.S. at 443 & n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (documents repeated congres-
sional refusal to make treble damages discretionary). Moreover, treble damages
encourage "private attorneys general" by providing private plaintiffs with the finan-
cial means and incentive to challenge anticompetitive conduct. Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 754 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); J. VAN CISE, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 47-48 (1975) (private enforcement may be more effective
than that of government).
210. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the public purposes advanced
by municipalities. See, e.g., Hill v. Memphis, 134 U.S. 198, 203 (1890) (compares
purposes of public and private corporations); Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 688-89 (1819) (Story, J., concurring) (munici-
palities further public purposes); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 50 (1915)
(Court first recognized public purposes advanced by local governments); see gener-
ally, Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1102-04 (1980)
(documents judicial recognition of public purposes furthered by municipalities); 56
AM. JUR. 2D § 14 Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions
(1971) (notes differing powers and beneficiaries of municipal and private corpora-
tions). In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court noted that
"[t]he public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be Viewed as a violation of the Sherman
Act in another context, be treated differently." Id. at 788-89 n. 17 (dictum) (lawyer
fee schedule). Relying on Goldfarb, lower courts have consistently applied the rule of
reason to professional anticompetitive conduct otherwise subject to per se illegality.
See, e.g., Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 624
F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (group boycott by
psychologists); Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977)
(tying arrangement by dentists); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F.
Supp. 532, 543 (E.D. La. 1981); Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F,
Supp. 1123 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (group boycott by paralegal training school); cf. Nara v.
American Dental Ass'n, 526 F. Supp. 452, 457 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (noncommercial
restrictions designed solely to benefit public are exempt from antitrust laws) (dic-
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Accommodating municipalities by recognizing, in substantive anti-
trust analysis, 212 benefits and harms unrelated to competition facili-
tates unrestrained judicial review of local economic regulations. 21 3
Legislative intent ordinarily restrains statutory review, therefore sub-
stantive economic review is avoided.2 1 4 Such judicial restraint does not
effectively exist in interpreting the Sherman Act as the lack of limiting
legislative history renders this statute nearly constitutional in its
breadth.21 5 Hence, courts applying the Sherman Act may "substitute
their view for those of the people's elected representatives in the state
and municipal legislatures-precisely the type of judicial lawmaking
which the court engaged in during the now discredited regime of
substantive due process. l" 1 Rather than the "liberty of contract"
turn); Selman v. Harvard Medical School, 494 F. Supp. 603, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(antitrust laws inapplicable to noncommercial aspects of medical profession). Certain
professional conduct, which would violate the Sherman Act if engaged in by private
parties, may survive under the rule of reason. However, the Supreme Court did not
intend to fashion a broad exception for learned professions. National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-91 (1978) (price fixing among
engineers). Clearly, if the "public service aspect" of professional conduct requires a
less rigorous application of antitrust law, then the public purposes advanced by
anticompetitive municipal activity deserve judicial recognition. Id. at 697. But see
notes 212-22 infra (similar rule of reason approach to municipalities raises problems
of unrestrained judicial review).
211. See notes 207-10 supra and accompanying text.
212. A balancing of the competitive harms against the public health, safety and
welfare benefits at the exemption stage has been proposed. Slater, Antitrust and
Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV.
71, 104-08 (1974); see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1976)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (rule of reason exemption approach). This approach is
subject to the same criticism as is a balancing approach in substantive antitrust
analysis. Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (N.D. Tex.
1978) (Blackmun's approach frustrates the judicial neutrality which Parker seeks).
213. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 849 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 628-30, 640 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting), citing
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("we have returned to the original
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws."); see Ely,
supra note 66, at 286 (fears return to unrestrained judicial review and proposes
"rational relation" test).
214. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v.
Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 333 (1975).
215. United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1970); see California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111 (1980)
(Congress exercises all of its constitutional power under the commerce clause in
enacting the Sherman Act) (citing Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers Inc. v. United States,
286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932)).
216. Handler, supra note 89, at 1382; see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730
(1963); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Lochner v. New York,
1982]
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theory used during the era of substantive due process, 217 courts would
use the procompetitive principles of the antitrust laws as the yardstick
for determining the reasonableness of local regulation.21 8
The Parker doctrine responds to fundamental principles of federal-
ism 219 and concerns for judicial economic neutrality.220 Parker was
decided soon after the Court repudiated the doctrine of substantive
due process. 22 1 As a result, this decision reflects the Court's unwilling-
ness to "commence a new round of invalidating state regulatory laws
on federal principles. 2 22 Analysis of public benefits unrelated to com-
petition in substantive antitrust analysis facilitates judicial lawmaking
and is consequently inimical to the Parker doctrine itself.
Since municipalities receive more federal deference than private
parties, their implicit equation in Boulder is not justifiable. A distinc-
tion favoring municipalities should be made at the exemption stage as
substantive antitrust law is unsuitable for recognizing the public bene-
fits conferred by municipalities which are not related to competition.
Thus, a municipal exemption from the antitrust laws reflecting state
sovereignty and federal procompetitive interests should be created by
198 U.S. 45, 74-75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Horsemen's Benevolent and
Protective Ass'n Inc., v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 530 F. Supp. 1098,
1102 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (judiciary is constitutionally prohibited from substituting their
social and economic beliefs for those of the legislature).
217. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating regulation of
bakers' hours).
218. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 849 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
219. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943); see Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 842;
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103
(1980); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 421 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Feldman v.
Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1306-07 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Horsemen's Benevolent and
Protective Ass'n Inc., v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 530 F. Supp. 1098,
1103 (E.D. Pa. 1982). When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, state and
municipal local regulation were largely beyond Congress' commerce power. City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 420-21 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Subsequent expansion of the commerce power under
the "affection doctrine" extended the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act. See
NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 605 n.1 (1939); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 636-38 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting), quoting Slater, supra note-134, at
85. This "retroactive expansion" of the Sherman Act's jurisdictional reach is largely
responsible for the Parker doctrine. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 636 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
220. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 422 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Woolen v.
Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Verkuil, supra
note 214, at 334; see Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Ass'n., Inc., v. Pennsyl-
vania Horse Racing Comm'n, 530 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
221. The doctrine of substantive due process was repudiated by the Court in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934). Parker was decided 5 years after Parrish.
222. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 421 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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the courts or the legislature. Since municipalities receive less federal
deference than states, this exemption must be qualified by making it
narrower than that enjoyed by states under the Parker doctrine. This
exemption must reflect the federalist concerns expressed in National
League of Cities v. Usery. At a minimum, anticompetitive municipal
conduct involving "integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
ment functions" should be exempt. To avoid emasculation of the
exemption, its terms should be liberally construed. In order to prevent
unrestrained judicial review of municipal economic regulation, the
balancing of public welfare benefits against anticompetitive harms
must be avoided. Municipal participation in a private anticompetitive
agreement and mere authorization of private anticompetitive conduct
should not receive protection under the qualified municipal exemp-
tion.
V. Conclusion
Employing exemption analysis, the Supreme Court in Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder implicitly equated munici-
palities and private parties under the Parker doctrine. This decision
exerts a significant adverse impact on local governmental operations.
Since application of the federal antitrust laws to municipal enact-
ments involves the interplay of two separate sovereigns, preemption
analysis should be utilized. In the alternative, municipalities should
be extended a qualified exemption from the antitrust laws because
they receive more federal deference than private parties. As this Com-
ment advocates, adoption of either approach will facilitate appropri-
ate recognition of the municipal role in our federalist system of gov-
ernment.
Martin Cronin
19821

